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I. INTRODUCTION 
You land at your hometown airport after taking a trip abroad when suddenly, 
a United States federal agent starts barking orders at you: Give me your phone.1 
Give me your laptop.2 Give me your camera.3 Sit here.4 Confused and scared, you 
do what you are told.5 You watch as the officer looks through your pictures, text 
messages, and emails.6 
When you finally get the courage to ask why, the response is: this is a border 
of the United States—a reason is not required to search your personal 
electronics.7 Next, you hear: I am going to retain your electronic devices.8 They 
will be transported to an off-site facility and forensically searched.9 Thank you 
for crossing the United States border.10 
From there, you later learn federal agents took your electronic devices to an 
off-site facility to make an exact copy of all the data on your electronic devices—
including all your deleted files.11 At the off-site facility, officers could spend 
 
1.  See Matt Novak, 9 Horror Stories From People Who Had Their Electronic Devices Searched at the 
Border, GIZMODO (Oct. 9, 2017), https://gizmodo.com/9-horror-stories-of-people-who-had-their-electronic-dev-
1818730022 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (recounting stories of Customs and Border 
Patrol taking individual’s phones and searching them). 
2.  See id. (recounting stories of Customs and Border Patrol taking individual’s laptops and searching 
them). 
3.  See id. (recounting stories of Customs and Border Patrol taking individual’s cameras and searching 
them). 
4.  See id. (recounting stories of Customs and Border Patrol making individual’s sit and watch agents 
search their electronic devices). 
5.  See id. (recounting stories of Customs and Border Patrol making individual’s sit and watch agents 
search their electronic devices). 
6.  See id. (recounting stories of Customs and Border Patrol taking individual’s electronic devices, 
searching through the content of the devices, and question individuals about the contents). 
7.  See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 607, 616 (1977) (holding that border searches are reasonable 
because they are conducted at the border). 
8.  See Novak, supra note 1 (recounting stories of Customs and Border Patrol retaining individual’s 
electronic devices after they are free to go). 
9.  See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 141 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding a forensic search of an 
electronic device at an off-site facility away from the initial stop was constitutional because law enforcement 
had individualized suspicion for the forensic search). 
10.  See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding no suspicion is required 
to forensically search an electronic device at the border). 
11.  See United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 546–47 (D.D.C. 2014) (discussing how border 
searches may be conducted away from the border). 
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months combing through all your data.12 In technical words, the United States 
can conduct a forensic search of your electronic devices without having any 
suspicion to do so.13 
The above encounter is legal at any border within the Eleventh Circuit’s 
jurisdiction.14 This scenario is a reality for travelers coming in and out of the 
numerous airports and seaports in the Eleventh Circuit.15 This jurisdiction 
includes Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, the busiest airport in 
the world with 104 million travelers in 2017.16 The above situation exists because 
Eleventh Circuit precedent declares forensic searches and seizures without any 
suspicion constitutional when initiated at any border.17 
Congress and the Judicial Branch of the United States have limited 
protections at borders since the founding of this country.18 Both branches have 
allowed a lower level of protection at borders because of the desire to secure the 
border.19 A circuit split has emerged, creating different levels of individualized 
protections against forensic searches of electronic devices at the border.20 
The law is clear in the United States; law enforcement agents are allowed to 
manually search any electronic devices without any level of suspicion at a 
border.21 Additionally, such searches and seizures happen frequently.22 Law 
enforcement can lawfully conduct manual searches of electronic devices at the 
border without a warrant, a showing of probable cause, or even reasonable 
suspicion to stop (seize) an individual.23 The jurisdictional split occurs when law 
 
12.  See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 141(holding a forensic search of an electronic device at an off-site facility 
away from the initial stop was constitutional because law enforcement had individualized suspicion for the 
forensic search). 
13.  See United States v. Feiten, No. 15-20631, 2016 WL 894452, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2016) 
(describing OS Triage as a software the government uses to make an exact copy of an electronic device in order 
to conduct a forensic search of the device). 
14.  See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (holding that no suspicion is required to forensically search an 
electronic device at the border). 
15.  Maureen O’Hare, The World’s Busiest Airports in 2017 Revealed, CNN (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/worlds-busiest-airports-preliminary 2017/index.html (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review); see also Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (holding that no suspicion is required 
to forensically search an electronic device at the border). 
16.  O’Hare, supra note 15. 
17.  See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (holding that no suspicion is required to forensically search an 
electronic device at the border). 
18.  See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 607, 616 (1977) (holding border searches are reasonable 
because they are conducted at the border). 
19.  See id. (holding that border searches are reasonable because they are conducted at the border). 
20.  Infra Part IV. 
21.  See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 149 (2004) (“Congress has always granted the 
Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a 
warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this 
country.”). 
22.  Novak, supra note 1. 
23.  See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 149 (“Congress has always granted the Executive plenary authority 
to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate 
the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country.”). 
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enforcement conducts a forensic search of electronic devices at the border.24 A 
forensic search occurs when a computer program is connected to an electronic 
device, and the program creates an exact copy of the electronic device.25 This 
program makes exact copies of all saved, viewed, and deleted data, starting with 
the very first piece of information viewed on the device.26 These devices include 
cellphones, computers, and cameras.27 
In all jurisdictions but one, where a Court of Appeals has ruled on this issue, 
law enforcement agents at United States borders are required by law to have 
some level of suspicion to conduct a forensic search.28 The Ninth Circuit requires 
reasonable suspicion for forensic searches of electronic devices at the border.29 In 
addition, the Fourth Circuit requires some level of individualized suspicion to do 
the same forensic search.30 Both levels of suspicion require specific facts that 
lead law enforcement to believe the electronic device possibly contains criminal 
evidence.31 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Ninth and Fourth Circuits’ limitations.32 
The Eleventh Circuit does not require any level of suspicion before conducting 
forensic searches of electronic devices at the border.33 The Eleventh Circuit made 
this rule despite the Supreme Court’s admonishment in Riley v. California that 
warrantless searches of electronic devices violate the Constitution via the Fourth 
Amendment.34 
The Fourth Amendment would cease to exist at United States borders 
without the guaranteed protections against unreasonable and warrantless searches 
and seizures.35 To alleviate the potential miscarriage of justice embedded in the 
Eleventh Circuit’s standard, the Supreme Court or Congress should require all 
law enforcement agents at United States borders to identify some level of 
suspicion before conducting a forensic search of electronic devices.36 To that end, 
 
24.  See United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 293 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting only two federal court 
cases have required reasonable suspicion for a forensic search). 
25.  United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 548 (D.D.C. 2014). 
26.  Id. at 547. 
27.  Id. at 552. 
28.  See Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d at 293 (noting only two federal court cases have required reasonable 
suspicion for a forensic search). 
29.  See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (holding reasonable 
suspicion is needed to forensically search an electronic device at the border). 
30.  See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 141 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding the forensic search of the 
electronic device at a facility away from the initial stop was constitutional because law enforcement had 
individualized suspicion).  
31.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (noting reasonable suspicion arises when an officer can 
articulate facts that lead him to believe the suspect may be connected to criminal activity). 
32.  United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018). 
33.  Id. 
34.  See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 373 (2014) (holding modern cell phones require a high level of 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures). 
35.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
36.  Infra Part IV. 
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this Comment proceeds as follows.37 Part II discusses the formation and 
development of the border search doctrine in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment.38 Part III addresses what constitutes a forensic search.39 Part IV 
analyzes the leading cases on forensic searches as well as the two Eleventh 
Circuit cases that created this circuit split.40 Part V proposes a standard created 
either by Congress or the Supreme Court that requires law enforcement to have 
some level of suspicion prior to a forensic search at the border.41 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES BORDER SEARCHES 
The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is 
relaxed at the border, but still in effect.42 However, the recent precedent from the 
Eleventh Circuit revoked all previous protections against unreasonable searches 
and seizures at the border.43 Section A discusses the laws relating to border 
searches before the ratification of the Fourth Amendment.44 Section B addresses 
the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.45 Section C examines the Supreme Court’s major decisions on the 
protections against unconstitutional border searches.46 
A. Pre-Fourth Amendment Border Protections 
The Framers of the United States considered searches at the border 
reasonable per se before the Fourth Amendment existed.47 Before Congress 
ratified the Fourth Amendment, the same Congress passed a customs law 
allowing for warrantless searches at borders.48 Specifically, the law “granted 
customs officials ‘full power and authority’ to enter and search ‘any ship or 
vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or 
merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed.’”49 The Supreme Court relied on 
this legislative history to demonstrate that the drafters of the Fourth Amendment 
 
37.  Infra Parts II-V. 
38.  Infra Part II. 
39.  Infra Part III. 
40.  Infra Part IV. 
41.  Infra Part V. 
42.  GOV. PRINTING OFF., FOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCH AND SEIZURE 1199, 1243 (1992), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-1992/html/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-5.htm (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
43.  Infra Part IV. 
44.  Infra Part II.A. 
45.  Infra Part II.B. 
46.  Infra Part II.C. 
47.  See United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886) (discussing the Founders’ intention to make 
border searches reasonable per se).  
48.  GOV. PRINTING OFF., supra note 42, at 1200. 
49.  Act of July 31, 1789, c. 5.1 Stat. 29 § 24. 
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did not intend for the Fourth Amendment’s protections to apply at the border.50 
The Court said “this act was passed by the same Congress which proposed for 
adoption the original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear that the members 
of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind (at the border) . . . 
as unreasonable, and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the 
amendment.”51 Drawing on the founders, our jurisprudence accepted the notion 
that border searches are per se constitutional absent a warrant or probable cause 
well before the establishment of the Fourth Amendment.52 
B. The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches 
and seizures of one’s person, home, papers, and effects.53 “A search compromises 
the individual interest in privacy; a seizure deprives the individual of dominion 
over his or her person or property.”54 A search is unreasonable when it is 
conducted without a warrant or a legally accepted exception.55 
The creation of the Fourth Amendment was in direct response to the intrusive 
searches the American colonists experienced from the British.56 The British 
executed unreasonable searches and seizures of colonists without a warrant or 
with general warrants.57 In a speech to the British Parliament on general 
warrants, William Pitt described the need to protect against unreasonable 
searches and seizures:58 “The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all 
the force of the crown. It may be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may blow 
through it—the storm may enter, the rain may enter—but the King of England 
cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined 
tenement.”59 The drafters took a cue from Mr. Pitt’s warning to Parliament and 
ratified the Fourth Amendment, ensuring protections against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.60 
 
50.  United States v. Feiten, No. 15-20631, 2016 WL 894452, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2016). 
51.  Id. (quoting United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
52.  United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 607, 616 (1977). 
53.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
54.  Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990). 
55.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment —
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”). 
56.  GOV. PRINTING OFF., supra note 42, at 1199. 
57.  See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 188 n.1 (1974) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (“Because the 
Crown had employed the general warrant, rather than the warrantless search, to invade the privacy of the 
colonists without probable cause and without limitation, it is not surprising that the hatred of the colonists 
focused on it.”). 
58.  Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (1994). 
59.  Id. 
60.  United States v. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914).  
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Under the Fourth Amendment, searches or seizures are unreasonable when 
conducted without a warrant or probable cause.61 However, there are several 
exceptions to both the warrant and probable cause requirements.62 One well-
established exception provides that searches and seizures at the border are per se 
reasonable and do not need a warrant or probable cause.63 
C. Border Search Cases 
Since the ratification of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Amendment’s application to border searches in several landmark 
cases.64 Subsection 1 reviews the Court’s analysis of physical searches of 
property at the border in United States v. Flores-Montano.65 Subsection 2 
addresses the Court’s analysis of searches of individuals at the border in United 
States v. Montoya De Hernandez.66 
1. United States v. Flores-Montano 
In this case, United States Border Patrol agents stopped Mr. Flores-Montano 
when he tried to enter the United States through a port in Southern California.67 
After the agent instructed Mr. Flores-Montano to get out of his car, the agents 
transported Mr. Flores-Montano’s vehicle to a secondary inspection station.68 
There, agents called a mechanic to inspect the vehicle.69 Upon arrival, the 
mechanic, “raised the car on a hydraulic lift, loosened the straps and unscrewed 
the bolts holding the gas tank to the undercarriage of the vehicle, and then 
disconnected some hoses and electrical connections.”70 After the mechanic 
removed the gas tank, he used a chemical substance to open the top of the gas 
tank to see inside and found contraband.71 
 
61.  Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).  
62.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment —
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752, 762–63 (1969) (holding that probable cause nor a warrant is required to search an individual or the area 
within their grabbing range after they have been lawfully arrested); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 336–37 
(1990) (holding that when officers conduct a valid arrest in a home, if there is probable cause to believe harm 
may be lurking in the home, the officers may do a protective sweep of the home without a warrant).  
63.  See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 607, 616 (1977) (holding border searches are reasonable 
because they are conducted at the border). 
64.  E.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004); United States v. Montoya De 
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985). 
65.  Infra Section II.C.1. 
66.  Infra Section II.C.2. 
67.  Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 150. 
68.  Id. 
69.  Id. at 151. 
70.  Id. 
71.  Id. 
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The Court found both the search and the seizure constitutional.72 According 
to the Court, Mr. Flores-Montano did not have a privacy interest in his fuel tank, 
and the agents did not need reasonable suspicion to disassemble his fuel tank.73 
The Court conducted a balancing test of the government’s interest in protecting 
the border and Mr. Flores-Montano’s right to privacy.74 The Court found the 
government was the clear winner.75 “The Government’s interest in preventing the 
entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international 
border.”76 In support of this analysis, the Court quoted United States v. Ramsey, 
“searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign 
to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into 
this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the 
border.”77 
The Court’s holding expanded the border search doctrine to allow physical 
manipulation of personal effects.78 Although agents deconstructed and physically 
manipulated Mr. Flores-Montano’s property, the Court considered it a lawful 
manual search.79 
2. United States v. Montoya De Hernandez 
In this case, Ms. Montoya De Hernandez flew to Los Angeles, California 
from Bogota, Colombia, but customs officials did not allow her to enter the 
United States.80 A United States customs inspector stopped her because she had 
made several recent trips to both Los Angeles and Miami.81 The inspector took 
her to a second inspection site, questioned her, and led her to a different area for 
a pat-down and strip search.82 After the pat down search, officers believed Ms. 
Montoya De Hernandez was smuggling drugs inside of her body.83 
After Ms. Montoya De Hernandez refused an x-ray because she asserted she 
was pregnant, the inspectors gave her three options—leave on the first flight back 
to Colombia, consent to the x-ray, or remain “in detention until she produced a 
monitored bowel movement that would confirm or rebut the inspectors’ 
suspicions.”84 Due to issues with her visa, the option to fly back was 
 
72.  Id. at 155. 
73.  Id. at 152. 
74.  Id. 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. 
77.  Id. at 152–53 (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 607, 616 (1977)). 
78.  Id. at 155–56. 
79.  Id. 
80.  United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 533 (1985). 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. at 534. 
83.  Id. 
84.  Id. at 534–35. 
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unavailable.85 Now limited to two options, Ms. Montoya De Hernandez opted to 
not eat, drink, or use the restroom for sixteen hours.86 Eventually, a court order 
forced her to submit to a pregnancy test in order to medically clear her for an x-
ray and rectal examination.87 
The Court held the search and seizure of Ms. Montoya De Hernandez 
constitutional and the sixteen-hour detention was not unreasonably long.88 The 
Court went on to say the search and seizure needed only reasonable suspicion 
because it occurred at the border and found law enforcement had reasonable 
suspicion, making the search constitutional.89 
III. ELECTRONIC SEARCHES 
Law enforcement conducts two types of electronic device searches: manual 
and forensic.90 At any United States border, law enforcement may manually 
search an electronic device.91 Courts consider a manual search of an electronic 
device a routine search, and therefore, legal.92 However, any manual search of an 
electronic device away from the border requires a warrant.93 Section A discusses 
the protections the Court developed against warrantless searches of cellphones in 
Riley v. California.94 Section B outlines routine and a non-routine border 
search.95 Section C describes the difference between a manual and a forensic 
search.96 
A. Riley v. California 
In Riley, the Supreme Court refused to extend the search incident to arrest97 
warrant exception to cellphones.98 Absent specialized exigent circumstances, 
such as remote wiping, data encryption, or potential physical threats from the 
 
85.  Id. at 535. 
86.  Id. 
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. at 544. 
89.  Id. 
90.  United States v. Caballero, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1016 (S.D. Cal. 2016). 
91.  Id. at 1015. 
92.  United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 141 (4th Cir. 2018). 
93.  See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 388 (2014) (holding absent exigent circumstances, law 
enforcement needs a warrant to search a cell phone).  
94.  Infra Section III.A. 
95.  Infra Section III.B. 
96.  Infra Section III.C. 
97.  See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for 
the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to 
use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.”).  
98.  Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 373 (2014).  
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device, a warrant is required to search a cellphone.99 The Court described why 
cellphones require such a high level of protection: “[A] cell phone search would 
typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a 
house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records 
previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private 
information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone is.”100 
The Court listed personal information that may be on a cell phone: medical 
records, calendars, contacts, messages, addresses, pictures, historic location data, 
and apps for planning a budget, tracking a pregnancy, improving one’s romantic 
life, and more.101 The private information a cellphone contains is the type of 
information the Fourth Amendment tries to protect against unreasonable 
invasions.102 In sum, Riley highlights the modern understanding that electronic 
devices present unique privacy issues and deserve additional protections beyond 
that of any other form of personal property.103 
B. Routine and Non-Routine Border Searches 
Courts across the country agree that law enforcement officers at the border 
are allowed to conduct routine searches of persons and their effects without 
reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant.104 In order to determine if a 
search is routine, courts look at the degree of intrusiveness or invasiveness of the 
search.105 Courts use the following factors when assessing whether the search 
was routine: 
 
“(i) whether the search results in the exposure of intimate body parts or 
requires the suspect to disrobe; (ii) whether physical contact between Customs 
officials and the suspect occurs during the search; (iii) whether force is used to 
effect the search; (iv) whether the type of search exposes the suspect to pain or 
danger; (v) the overall manner in which the search is conducted; and (vi) whether 
the suspect’s reasonable expectations of privacy, if any, are abrogated by the 
search.106 
 
Non-routine searches can intrude deeply into a person’s privacy.107 
Recognized types of non-routine searches include strip searches, alimentary-
 
99.  Id. at 388–89. 
100.  Id. at 396–97 (emphasis in original). 
101.  Id. at 395–96. 
102.  Id. at 408 (Alito, J., concurring). 
103.  See id. at 373 (holding cellphones may not be searched during a search incident to arrest absent a 
warrant or exigent circumstances). 
104.  United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 511 (1st Cir. 1988). 
105.  Id. at 511. 
106.  Id. at 512. 
107.  United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 144 (4th Cir. 2018). 
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canal searches, and x-rays.108 
On the other hand, routine searches at the border are exempt from the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment.109 Types of routine searches include pat-
downs; pocket-dumps; moving or adjusting clothing; scanning, opening, and 
rifling through the contents of bags or other closed containers; looking inside an 
automobile gas tank; browsing contents of photograph albums, information 
encoded on videotapes, or password-protected items; and having a dog sniff at an 
individual’s groin.110 Courts have also concluded manual searches of electronic 
devices are considered routine.111 
C. Manual and Forensic Searches 
The search of a computer without any sophisticated forensic techniques and 
in the same manner that a user would use the computer is a routine and manual 
search.112 Therefore, a routine and manual search of an electronic device at the 
border may be done by law enforcement without any reasonable suspicion.113 
The techniques used for a forensic search are different from a manual 
search.114 A forensic search is more intrusive than a manual search because it 
goes beyond what a normal user would see on a computer.115 This is because a 
forensic search uses “sophisticated technology-assisted search methodologies 
[that] can exceed vastly the capacity of a human searching and viewing files.”116 
A forensic search starts “with the creation of a perfect ‘bitstream’ copy or 
‘image’ of the original storage device.”117 This bitstream copy is then saved as a 
read-only file.118 After that, a computer forensics expert uses specialized software 
to look at the data.119 During this process, which can last anywhere from a day to 
months, the expert reviews all of the contents on the “imaged hard drive, 
examining the properties of individual files, and probing the drive’s unallocated 
 
108.  Id. at 144. 
109.  See id. at 141 (noting the manual search of Kolsuz’s phone was a routine search which are not 
subject to Fourth Amendment requirements). 
110.  United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 549 (D.D.C. 2014). 
111.  See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 141 (noting the manual search of Kolsuz’s phone was a routine search and 
routine searches are not subject to Fourth Amendment requirements). 
112.  Id. at 144. 
113.  See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 295 
(2015) (noting “[i]n most cases, searches at the border are always permitted even without reasonable 
suspicion”); e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F. 3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[R]easonable suspicion is not 
needed for customs officials to search a laptop or other personal electronic storage devices at the border.”). 
114.  Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 547. 
115.  Id. 
116.  Id. 
117.  Id. 
118.  Id. 
119.  Id. 
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‘slack space’ to reveal deleted files.”120 The circuit split began when different 
circuits announced different levels of suspicion required to conduct forensic 
searches at the border.121 
IV. CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT ON FORENSIC SEARCHES AT THE BORDER 
In 2018, the Eleventh Circuit became the first circuit to hold no level of 
suspicion is required to forensically search an electronic device at the border.122 
Other circuits have reached the opposite holding.123 Section A discusses the 
precedent regarding forensic searches in the Fourth Circuit.124 Section B 
examines similar precedent in the Ninth Circuit.125 Finally, Section C looks at the 
two Eleventh Circuit cases that eliminated the requirement of any suspicion 
before forensically searching an electronic device at the border.126 
A. Fourth Circuit Forensic Border Search Law 
The Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Kolsuz a forensic search of a 
digital phone is a non-routine search that requires some level of individualized 
suspicion.127 In this case, Mr. Kolsuz had a history of attempting to illegally take 
firearm parts out of the United States.128 Before the incident at issue, law 
enforcement agents stopped Mr. Kolsuz on two previous occasions for having 
unregistered and unlicensed firearm parts in his suitcase.129 In both prior 
instances, Mr. Kolsuz attempted to fly from John F. Kennedy International 
Airport to Turkey.130 Both times, law enforcement agents confiscated the illegal 
firearms parts and instructed Mr. Kolsuz on the law.131 After these warnings, Mr. 
Kolsuz again tried to fly out of the United States, this time from Dulles 
International Airport to Turkey.132 United States law enforcement found multiple 
firearms parts in his suitcase, including: eighteen handgun barrels, twenty-two 
9mm handgun magazines, four .45 caliber handgun magazines, and other gun 
 
120.  Id. 
121.  Infra Part IV. 
122.  United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018). 
123.  See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (holding law 
enforcement must have reasonable suspicion before conducting a forensic search of an electronic device at the 
border); United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 144 (4th Cir. 2018) (“forensic border search of a phone must be 
treated as non-routine, permissible only on a showing of individualized suspicion”). 
124.  Infra Section IV.B. 
125.  Infra Section IV.C. 
126.  Id. 
127.  Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 146. 
128.  Id. at 138. 
129.  Id. 
130.  Id. 
131.  Id. 
132.  Id. at 139. 
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components.133 
The issue before the court was whether the agents’ confiscation of Mr. 
Kolsuz’s cellphone and subsequent searches of the cellphone were 
constitutional.134 The first search was a manual search, which revealed recent 
calls and text messages.135 The court concluded the manual search was a routine 
search and fell under the border search exception.136 Thus, the court noted the 
law enforcement officers did not need reasonable suspicion for the first search.137 
The court considered the second search a forensic search.138 The forensic 
search occurred four miles away from Dulles International Airport at a Homeland 
Security Investigation office.139 During this search, a computer forensic agent ran 
a program on the phone that created an 896-page report of the phone’s 
contents.140 The report included “personal contact lists, emails, messenger 
conversations, photographs, videos, calendar, web browsing history, and call 
logs, along with a history of Kolsuz’s physical location down to precise GPS 
coordinates.”141 
The court held that officers must have individualized suspicion before 
conducting non-routine forensic searches of electronic devices.142 Despite the 
court’s lack of a clear standard (e.g., reasonable suspicion), the court noted the 
agents were correct in this case to rely on the reasonable suspicion standard.143 
The court further noted that despite Riley, no precedent requires anything above 
reasonable suspicion when it comes to forensic searches of electronic devices at 
the border.144 
B. Ninth Circuit Forensic Border Search Law 
The Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Cotterman that there must be a 
showing of reasonable suspicion before law enforcement can forensically search 
an electronic device at the border.145 Subsection 1 discusses the majority opinion 
in Cotterman.146 Subsection 2 addresses the arguments raised by Judge 
Callahan’s concurrence and Judge Smith’s dissent.147 
 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. at 141. 
135.  Id. at 139. 
136.  Id. at 141. 
137.  Id. 
138.  Id. 
139.  Id. at 139. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Id. at 146. 
143.  Id. at 148 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). 
144.  Id. at 147 (majority opinion). 
145.  United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
146.  Infra Section IV.B.1. 
147.  Infra Section IV.B.2. 
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1. Majority Opinion in United States v. Cotterman 
In United States v. Cotterman, border agents stopped Mr. Cotterman and his 
wife when the couple tried to enter the United States through Mexico.148 Mr. 
Cotterman’s previous convictions in 1992 for child molestation and lewd and 
lascivious conduct triggered an alert at the border crossing.149 Due to the alert, 
agents stopped Mr. Cotterman’s vehicle.150 After searching the vehicle, the 
agents discovered two laptops and a camera.151 Law enforcement then 
confiscated the devices and transported them 170 miles away to an Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office.152 At the ICE office, a computer forensic 
examiner used a forensic program to search the electronic devices.153 During the 
initial search of the computer, the agent discovered seventy-five images of child 
pornography.154 
Later that day, the forensic examiner contacted Mr. Cotterman for assistance 
in unlocking some password-protected files on Mr. Cotterman’s computer.155 Mr. 
Cotterman agreed to get back to the forensic examiner once he located the 
passwords.156 Instead of supplying the passwords, Mr. Cotterman flew to Mexico 
the next day and then onward to Australia.157 Nevertheless, the forensic examiner 
eventually gained access.158 The computer had approximately 378 images of 
child pornography.159 Most of the images were taken over a two- to three-year 
period of the same young girl.160 Several photos depicted Mr. Cotterman sexually 
molesting a young girl.161 The forensic examiner continued the search 
discovering “hundreds more pornographic images, stories, and videos depicting 
children.”162 
At the first hearing of the case, the Ninth Circuit held reasonable suspicion 
was not required for this search.163 However, in an en banc hearing, the court 
reversed and concluded reasonable suspicion was required for the forensic 
searches of the electronic devices.164 Nonetheless, the court determined the 
 
148.  Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 957. 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. 
151.  Id. 
152.  Id. at 958. 
153.  Id. 
154.  Id. 
155.  Id. 
156.  Id. 
157.  Id. at 959. 
158.  Id. 
159.  Id. 
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164.  Id. at 962. 
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officers had reasonable suspicion to forensically search Mr. Cotterman’s 
computer and reversed motion to suppress.165 
2. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in United States v. Cotterman 
In her concurrence, Judge Callahan charged the majority with ignoring over a 
century of Supreme Court precedent and argued this new rule of requiring 
reasonable suspicion to forensically search electronic devices is “unworkable and 
unnecessary, and [would] severely hamstring the government’s ability to protect 
our borders.”166 Judge Callahan made two arguments in her concurrence.167 
First, a review of the Supreme Court’s precedent shows the Court has tried to 
keep standards for conducting searches at the border flexible.168 The Court has 
only required reasonable suspicion in one case.169 In that case, Montoya de 
Hernandez, the individual was subjected to a 24-hour detention and several 
intrusive examinations of her person.170 In all remaining cases before the 
Supreme Court, the Court confirmed the government’s wide authority to search 
at the border.171 
Judge Callahan’s second argument addressed the three possible border search 
situations the Court held would not be per se reasonable, and concluded none 
were applicable in this case.172 In Flores-Montano, the Court announced that a 
border search might not be reasonable and would require reasonable suspicion in 
three situations;173 “highly intrusive searches of the person; destructive searches 
of property; and conducted in a ‘particularly offensive’ manner.”174 Judge 
Callahan indicated the first two situations were plainly not applicable.175 First, 
border agents did not search Mr. Cotterman’s person—just his property.176 
Second, the border agents did not destroy Mr. Cotterman’s property.177 As for the 
third justification, Judge Callahan argued searching a computer, which is capable 
of storing a large amount of personal information, does not make the search 
“particularly offensive.”178 For support, Judge Callahan cited Ninth Circuit 
precedent stating searching computers does not enhance Fourth Amendment 
 
165.  Id. at 970. 
166.  Id. at 971 (Callahan, J., concurring). 
167.  Id.  
168.  Id. at 971–72. 
169.  Id. at 971. 
170.  Id. at 971–72 (citing United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985)). 
171.  Id. at 972. 
172.  Id. at 973. 
173.  Id. 
174.  Id. 
175.  Id. at 974–75. 
176.  Id. at 973. 
177.  Id. 
178.  Id. at 977. 
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protections.179 “[C]omputers are [not] special for Fourth Amendment purposes by 
virtue of how much information they store; neither the quantity of information, 
nor the form in which it is stored, is legally relevant in the Fourth Amendment 
context.”180 
In his dissent, Judge Smith voiced a policy concern stating the majority’s 
ruling would burden law enforcement and create national security issues.181 The 
dissent said law enforcement would have to make a “complex legal 
determination on the spot.”182 Under the standard created by the majority, law 
enforcement must determine if a search of an individual’s data is allowed 
because it is “unintrusive” or if the search is illegal because it is “comprehensive 
and intrusive.”183 The dissent notes a Customs and Border Protection directive, 
“border searches of electronic storage devices are ‘essential’ for ‘detect[ing] 
evidence relating to terrorism and other national security matters.’”184 Echoes of 
Judge Callahan’s and Judge Smith’s arguments are present in the two 2018 
Eleventh Circuit cases adopting suspicion-less forensic searches at the border.185 
C. Eleventh Circuit Forensic Border Search Law 
The Eleventh Circuit recently announced new precedent on the 
constitutionality of searches of electronic devices at the border.186 Subsection 1 
reviews the Eleventh Circuit holding in United States v. Vergara.187 In that case, 
the court rejected requiring a warrant or probable cause to forensically search 
electronic devices at the border.188 Subsection 2 analyzes the Eleventh Circuit 
case of United States v. Touset.189 Touset created the circuit split when the court 
announced law enforcement does not need any suspicion to forensically search 
an electronic device at the border.190 
 
179.  Id. at 978.  
180.  Id. (quoting United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
181.  Id. at 984 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id. 
184.  Id. at 985 (alteration in original). 
185.  See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1229 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding the Fourth Amendment 
does not require any suspicion for forensic searches of electronic devices at the border); United States v. 
Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding border searches never require probable cause or a 
warrant and only highly intrusive border searches require reasonable suspicion).  
186.  Touset, 890 F.3d at 1229 (holding the Fourth Amendment does not require any suspicion for 
forensic searches of electronic devices at the border); Vergara, 884 F.3d at 1309 (holding border searches never 
require probable cause or a warrant and only highly intrusive border searches require reasonable suspicion). 
187.  Infra Section IV.C.1. 
188.  Infra Section IV.C.1. 
189.  Infra Section IV.C.2. 
190.  Infra Section IV.C.2. 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51 
71 
1. United States v. Vergara 
In Vergara, the Eleventh Circuit held border searches never require a warrant 
or probable cause.191 Mr. Vergara returned to Florida on a cruise ship from 
Mexico.192 Officers stopped and searched Mr. Vergara because of his prior 
conviction for possession of child pornography.193 During the search, officers 
found three cellphones in Mr. Vergara’s possession.194 During a manual search of 
one phone, the officer immediately recognized a video as possible child 
pornography.195 The officer reached out to a criminal investigator with the 
Department of Homeland Security who confirmed the video was child erotica.196 
After this discovery, a Homeland Security officer confiscated the cellphones in 
order to conduct forensic searches on them.197 The search uncovered “more than 
100 images and videos of child pornography and erotica stored on Vergara’s 
phones.”198 
After reviewing the facts in this case, the court reaffirmed the law that 
searches at the border do not require a warrant or probable cause.199 However, the 
court noted reasonable suspicion might be required in cases of “highly intrusive 
searches of a person’s body such as a strip search or an x-ray examination.”200 
The court implied searches of electronic devices, whether manual or forensic, 
would not require a warrant or probable cause.201 The court avoided the issue of 
whether reasonable suspicion is required when forensically searching electronic 
devices at the border because Mr. Vergara did not challenge the lack of 
reasonable suspicion.202 Additionally, the court said only certain searches of a 
person require reasonable suspicion, but reasonable suspicion is not required for 
searches of property.203 
Two months later, the same court in an opinion by the same judge held 
suspicion-less forensic searches of electronic devices at the border are 
constitutional.204 
 
191.  Vergara, 884 F.3d at 1312. 
192.  Id. at 1311. 
193.  Id. 
194.  Id. 
195.  Id. 
196.  Id. at 1314 (Pryor, J., dissenting). 
197.  Id. 
198.  Id. at 1311 (majority opinion). 
199.  Id. at 1312. 
200.  Id. 
201.  Id. 
202.  Id. at 1313. 
203.  Id. at 1312 (holding border searches do not require a warrant or probable and that only highly 
intrusive searches of a person require reasonable suspicion). 
204.  See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1229 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding the Fourth Amendment 
does not require any suspicion for forensic searches of electronic devices at the border). 
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2. United States v. Touset 
Judge Pryor, of the Eleventh Circuit, expanded the rule from Vergara by 
announcing in Touset that no suspicion is required to forensically search an 
electronic device at the border.205 In this case, the investigation of Mr. Touset 
started long before he arrived at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International 
Airport.206 
Xoom, a company that transmits money, noticed a pattern of transfers 
consistent with “people it suspected were involved with child pornography.”207 
Xoom learned that Mr. Touset’s account was linked with Yahoo email and 
messenger accounts.208 With that information, Xoom contacted both Yahoo and 
the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.209 During an 
investigation, Yahoo found the account Xoom identified.210 The account had a 
file containing child pornography.211 Yahoo sent this information to the National 
Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which in turn notified the Cyber 
Crime Center of the Department of Homeland Security.212 
After the Department of Homeland Security issued subpoenas in relation to 
the investigation, Western Union responded with Mr. Touset’s name and post 
office box, which was also linked to the Yahoo account.213 All of this 
investigation occurred before Mr. Touset’s international flight even touched 
down in Atlanta, Georgia.214 
Once Mr. Touset arrived, an officer from Customs and Border Protection 
searched his luggage and discovered several electronic devices: two iPhones, a 
camera, two laptops, two external hard drives, and two tablets.215 Law 
enforcement confiscated and conducted a forensic search on the devices 
revealing child pornography on the laptops and the external hard drives.216 With 
this evidence, law enforcement secured a warrant to search Mr. Touset’s home in 
Georgia.217 The search turned up evidence of thousands of images of child 
pornography and uncovered Mr. Touset paid over $55,000 for “pornographic 
pictures, videos, and webcam sessions” and an “excel spreadsheet that 
documented the names, ages, and birthdates of young girls in the photos, as well 
 
205.  Id. 
206.  Id. at 1230. 
207.  Id. 
208.  Id. 
209.  Id. 
210.  Id. 
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212.  Id. 
213.  Id. 
214.  Id. 
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as his personal notes about them.”218 
The court held reasonable suspicion was not required to forensically search 
the electronic devices because the search was of property and not a person.219 The 
court openly acknowledged conducting an intrusive search of a person at the 
border requires reasonable suspicion.220 Further, the court conceded a search of 
an electronic device may be intrusive;221 however, the court stood by its 
interpretation of the jurisprudence and held, “our precedents do not require 
suspicion for [an] intrusive search of any property at the border.”222 
Mr. Touset argued the Supreme Court’s ruling in Riley was meant to protect 
privacy by requiring a warrant to search all cellphones.223 The court in Touset 
disagreed and reiterated the holding in Riley is limited to the search incident to 
arrest exception, which was not applicable with this case.224 Therefore, the court 
resorted to the border search doctrine for guidance.225 
The court reiterated the need for a balance between the government’s 
security interest and an individual’s privacy interest.226 The Ninth Circuit and the 
Fourth Circuit in Cotterman and Kolsuz argued travelers could not protect their 
privacy because it is impractical and unreasonable for travelers to travel without 
their electronic devices.227 In contrast, the Touset court asserted travel has been 
inconvenient for quite some time and travelers grow accustomed to 
inconveniences.228 The court mentioned some inconvenience of modern travel 
such as “screening procedures that require passengers to unpack electronic 
devices, separate and limit liquids, gels, and creams, remove their shoes, and 
walk through a full-body scanner.”229 The court emphasized property, unlike 
persons, could always be left at home when traveling and remain free from 
searches.230 
After allowing suspicion-less forensic searches at borders, the court said, “if 
we were to require reasonable suspicion for searches of electronic devices, we 
would create special protections for the property most often used to store and 
 
218.  Id. at 1230–31. 
219.  See id. at 1234 (noting “property and persons are different”). 
220.  Id. 
221.  Cf. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Callahan, J., 
dissenting) (arguing searching a computer is not particularly offensive). 
222.  Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (citing United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 728–29, 732 (11th 
Cir. 2009)). 
223.  Id. 
224.  Id. 
225.  Id. 
226.  Id. at 1236. 
227.  United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 965 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); United States v. Kolsuz, 
890 F.3d 133, 145 (4th Cir. 2018). 
228.  Touset, 890 F.3d at 1235. 
229.  Id. (citing Corbett v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 767 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2014)). 
230.  Id. 
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disseminate child pornography.”231 In the opinion, the court called upon Congress 
to make a law dictating the standard required for a forensic search of electronic 
devices at the border.232 “Instead of ‘charging unnecessarily ahead,’ we must 
allow Congress to design the appropriate standard ‘through the more adaptable 
legislative process and the wider lens of legislative hearings.’”233 
In order to insulate the case from Supreme Court review, Judge Pryor wrote 
the opinion in a manner limiting the Supreme Court’s ability to hear the case.234 
The court in Touset held that even if reasonable suspicion was required in order 
for the search to be constitutional, law enforcement had reasonable suspicion for 
the search.235 By holding the search constitutional, the Supreme Court would not 
be able to change the outcome of this case, making the case nonjusticiable.236 The 
Supreme Court could only change the law, not the outcome, which likely 
lessened the chance of Supreme Court review.237 
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Supporters of the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Touset fail to look past the 
limited reasoning the court supplies.238 In Touset, the court feared there was no 
feasible way to protect against child pornography entering the country.239 While 
the court’s concern might be valid, it is also shortsighted.240 Officials might stop 
and search under the guise of protecting against child pornography, but how 
would a traveler know that was the actual reason for the search?241 There is no 
legal requirement for officers to explain the reason for a stop and search.242 The 
search could be motivated by any discriminatory basis, including gender, 
political affiliation, religion, nationality, age, disability, or worse, no reason at 
all.243 
 
231.  Id. 
232.  Id. at 1237. 
233.  Id. (citing United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 150 (4th Cir. 2018) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)).  
234.  Kerr, supra note 113. 
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237.  Id. 
238.  See generally Forensic Searches of Digital Information at the Border – Eleventh Circuit Holds that 
Border Searches of Property Require No Suspicion, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1112 (2019) [hereinafter Forensic 
Searches] (agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit reasoning that preventing child pornography from entering the 
country was a sufficient basis for allowing suspicionless forensic searches of electronic devices at the border).  
239.  Touset, 890 F.3d at 1236. 
240.  Forensic Searches, supra note 238, at 1119. 
241.  See Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Illinois, and the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 9, United States v. Wanjiku, No. 18-1973 (7th 
Cir. argued Nov. 7, 2018), 2018 WL 3602348, at *9 (“To rule otherwise would give the government unfettered 
access to an incredible compendium of the most intimate aspects of people’s lives simply because they have 
decided to travel internationally.”). 
242.  Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233. 
243.  Cf. id. (holding no suspicion is required to forensically search an electronic device at the border). 
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This “parade of horribles” could very easily turn into a reality.244 Under the 
Eleventh Circuit’s precedent, any forensic search of electronic devices at the 
border is reasonable per se.245 Any traveler through any point of entry into the 
United States in the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdiction could have every electronic 
device taken, copied, and forensically examined without cause.246 The Fourth 
Amendment is still in the Constitution, despite the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in 
Touset.247 
Not only is allowing law enforcement free range to forensically search any 
electronic device unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, it implicates 
other fundamental rights, namely, privacy.248 Consider the following 
hypotheticals: honeymooners return home with private photos, a CEO of a 
foreign entity has confidential strategic plans on her laptop, a doctor with patient 
information in his email, an attorney with confidential client information on her 
hard drive—all information the United States government can view, copy, and 
study without cause.249 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To resolve the circuit split and maintain the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections, Congress should act to ensure forensic searches of electronics at the 
border require reasonable suspicion.250 In lieu of a Congressional rule, Section A 
addresses a possible Supreme Court solution.251 Section B discusses the more 
pragmatic solution of a law created by Congress.252 
A. Supreme Court Solution 
In order to protect Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court should 
review a case concerning forensic searches at the border.253 To preserve the 
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247.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (holding forensic searches of electronic 
devices at the border require no level of suspicion). 
248.  See Novak, supra note 1 (recounting stories of Customs and Border Patrol taking individual’s 
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250.  Infra Part VI. 
251.  Infra Section VI.A. 
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because the Court would not be able to change the outcome of the case, only the law).  
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Fourth Amendment and adhere to precedent, the Court should require reasonable 
suspicion before conducting a forensic search of electronic devices at the 
border.254 This would allow the Court to engage in a balance testing between the 
government interest in protecting the border and preserving individual rights.255 
Such a ruling would follow the reasoning in Riley by recognizing electronic 
devices are different than other types of personal property and deserve special 
protections due to the privacy risks presented.256 This ruling would also maintain 
the government’s strong interest in securing the border by continuing to allow 
manual searches of electronic devices.257 
However, a judicial holding would allow the Court to create a standard on a 
matter that is typically reserved to Congress.258 “Imposing a Fourth Amendment 
floor at the border without congressional input would amount to an inflexible, 
‘hugely consequential policy judgment’ that would lack the benefits of 
consultation with national security officials and privacy advocacy groups, as well 
as the constraining influence of legislative consensus-building.”259 
Further, courts have already tried to grapple with the complex balancing test 
and refused to make a decision due to the complicated issues.260 In the Northern 
District of Illinois, Judge Bucklo refused to answer whether a forensic preview is 
a non-routine search requiring reasonable suspicion.261 Judge Bucklo fought 
between siding with the Court’s reasoning in Riley and the reasoning in Montoya 
de Hernandez.262 Unable to see a clear victor in this balancing test, Judge Bucklo 
denied the motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the officers had at 
least reasonable suspicion for the search.263 
B. A Congressional Solution 
In lieu of a Supreme Court ruling, Congress should pass a statute to resolve 
the circuit split by requiring reasonable suspicion in order to conduct a forensic 
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exception does not apply to electronic devices absent exigent circumstances). 
257.  See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir. 2018) (the court called for the 
legislative branch to make a law deciding the standard needed to forensically search electronic devices at the 
border). 
258.  Forensic Searches, supra note 238, at 1119. 
259.  Id. (quoting United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 151 (4th Cir. 2018)). 
260.  United States v. Wanjiku, No. 16 CR 296, 2017 WL 1304087, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2017). 
261.  Id. (“I conclude that this is not the appropriate case in which to wrestle these difficult issues to the 
ground.”). 
262.  Id. 
263.  Id. 
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search of an electronic device at the border.264 A statute may be preferable to a 
Supreme Court ruling because it would allow for full discussion of the issue with 
stakeholders through the legislative process.265 This statutory solution could 
promote stability and clarity by defining forensic searches and providing that 
only certain electronic devices, such as cellphones and laptops, deserve this 
increased protection.266 Despite Judge Callahan’s concern that having law 
enforcement engage in a reasonable suspicion test is unnecessarily burdensome, 
the United States Customs and Border Protection has issued a directive requiring 
reasonable suspicion for a forensic search.267 This directive shows a statute 
requiring reasonable suspicion is feasible and not overly burdensome.268 Through 
a statutory solution, Congress can ensure the Fourth Amendment continues to 
protect privacy, even at the border.269 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In May 2018, a circuit split emerged putting the Eleventh Circuit at odds 
with the Ninth and Fourth Circuits.270 The Eleventh Circuit held reasonable 
suspicion is not required to conduct a forensic search of electronic devices at the 
border.271 In contrast, the Ninth and Fourth Circuits held that either reasonable 
suspicion or some level of individualized suspicion is required in order to 
conduct this type of search.272 Despite the strong legislative intent and historical 
background on the protections afforded in the Fourth Amendment, the Eleventh 
Circuit relied primarily on the border search doctrine for support in reaching its 
conclusion.273 The other two circuits relied on the Fourth Amendment for support 
in requiring some level of suspicion.274 
To resolve this circuit split, the Supreme Court or Congress should set out a 
standard governing the level of suspicion required at the border to create 
uniformity throughout all of the United States’ borders.275 Reasonable suspicion 
 
264.  See, e.g., Traveler’s Privacy Protection Act of 2008, S. 3612, 110th Cong. § 4 (proposing to require 
reasonable suspicion before an electronic device could be searched at the border). 
265.  See The Legislative Process, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
https://www.house.gov/the-house-explained/the-legislative-process (last visited Jan. 12, 2019) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
266.  See Traveler’s Privacy Protection Act of 2008, S. 3612, 110th Cong. § 3 (providing definitions for 
the bill, such as “electronic equipment”). 
267.  Kevin McAleenan, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, Directive No. 3340-049A, at 5 (Jan. 4, 2018). 
268.  See id. (requiring reasonable suspicion before an “advanced search” may be conducted). 
269.  See, e.g., Traveler’s Privacy Protection Act of 2008, S. 3612, 110th Cong. § 4 (proposing to require 
reasonable suspicion before an electronic device could be searched at the border). 
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should be the standard to conduct a forensic search of an electronic device at the 
border.276 The clear language of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, as well as the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Riley, 
indicate the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures 
encompasses electronic devices, even if searched at the border.277 
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